The Bayes factor BF12 is the ratio of marginal likelihoods of two models M1 and M2:
BF12=p(y∣M2)p(y∣M1)
where p(y∣Mk)=∫L(θ;y)p(θ∣Mk)dθ is the marginal data density (evidence) under model k. Values BF12>1 favour M1; the Jeffreys (1961) scale classifies lnBF12>1 as "substantial" and >5 as "decisive."
Key Ideas
Automatic Occam's razor: the marginal likelihood penalises overparameterised models automatically through the prior predictive — models with high flexibility are penalised for spreading prior mass over unlikely data regions.
No free parameters: unlike Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)/Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), Bayes factors make no asymptotic approximation; they are exact given the prior.
Prior sensitivity: since BF12 depends on the prior, improper or vague priors make BF12 undefined or Bartlett-paradox-prone; proper priors are required.
Posterior model probabilities: given prior model probabilities P(Mk), the posterior odds equal prior odds times Bayes factor: P(M1∣y)/P(M2∣y)=BF12⋅P(M1)/P(M2).
How It Works
Closed form: available for conjugate models (Normal-Wishart Vector Autoregression, VAR); see Marginal Data Density.
Chib (1995) identity: for Gibbs-sampler output logp(y)=logL(θ∗∣y)+logp(θ∗)−logp(θ∗∣y), evaluated at a point estimate.
Harmonic mean estimator (Newton-Raftery 1994): p^(y)=[G−1∑gL(θ(g);y)−1]−1 — consistent but has infinite variance in practice.
Bridge sampling (Meng-Wong 1996): more stable than harmonic mean; recommended for high-dimensional posteriors.
BIC as an asymptotic Bayes factor (Raftery 1986): under mild conditions −2logB01≃pχ2−slogn=BIC (Schwarz 1978), where χ2 is the likelihood-ratio statistic, s the number of extra constraints, and n the sample size — so the Schwarz criterion is an O(1) approximation to twice the log Bayes factor that avoids the prior-elicitation and integration problems (later systematized by Kass-Raftery 1995). For log-linear contingency-table models the Spiegelhalter-Smith (1982) approximate Bayes factor is indeterminate at empty cells; replacing their prior with a proper Jeffreys prior (equivalently, adding 21 to each cell count) both removes the zero-cell problem and eliminates the arbitrary constant that vague priors otherwise introduce.
Why It Matters
Bayes factors provide the canonical Bayesian approach to model selection and hypothesis testing, including non-nested comparisons that classical likelihood ratio tests cannot handle.
Open Questions
Sensitivity to the choice of prior on parameters — particularly important for testing point null hypotheses (the Savage-Dickey density ratio applies when the null is nested).
The Bayes factor reversal (BFR) paradox (Lovric 2025). Prior sensitivity can flip the direction of the evidence, not merely its magnitude. In the normal model with known variance, reparametrizing by k=nτ2 (effective prior precision) gives BF01(z;k)=1+kexp(−2(1+k)z2k): at k=0 it is 1 (neutral); as k→∞ it diverges to +∞ (favouring the null — the Jeffreys–Lindley effect); and for any two-sided result significant at 0.05 there is a flip point in between where the Bayes factor crosses 1. So the same data testing the same hypothesis can favour the alternative under one prior variance and the null under another, purely from the prior choice — and, unlike the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox which needs n→∞, this occurs at realistic sample sizes (formalizing Robert's 2016 concern about prior-scale arbitrariness).
Computational difficulty for large models where Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is required to estimate each marginal likelihood.