Fama and French add profitability and investment factors to their 1993 three-factor model, producing a five-factor model (market, size, value, profitability, investment) aimed at the size, value, profitability, and investment patterns in average stock returns. The five-factor model outperforms the three-factor model; its main failure is the low average returns of small stocks that invest heavily despite low profitability. Notably, once the profitability and investment factors are included, the value factor (HML) becomes redundant for describing average returns in their sample.
"A five-factor model directed at capturing the size, value, profitability, and investment patterns in average stock returns performs better than the three-factor model of Fama and French (FF, 1993)."
"With the addition of profitability and investment factors, the value factor of the FF three-factor model becomes redundant for describing average returns in the sample we examine."
The paper that made "profitability and investment" standard risk controls and, in the same breath, unsettled the value premium by showing HML redundant once RMW and CMA are present. The dividend-discount motivation is elegant but the factors remain empirically-constructed spread portfolios, so the risk-vs-mispricing question is left open — as is the awkward small-cap-that-invests-heavily failure the authors flag honestly. Its real legacy is agenda-setting: adding two factors and retiring one sharpened the "how many factors are real?" question that the joint-hypothesis problem guarantees can never be settled by a single test, and that the factor-zoo literature (Feng-Giglio-Xiu 2020) then tackles head-on.