Overview
Liran Einav is a professor of economics at Stanford University and NBER research associate. His work spans health insurance markets, adverse selection, moral hazard, and insurance contract design, frequently using structural estimation methods on firm-level and administrative data.
Key Contributions / Features
- Selection on moral hazard (Einav, Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf, and Cullen 2013): Lead author; demonstrated that selection on the slope of spending (anticipated moral hazard response) is roughly as important as selection on levels (expected health risk) in determining health insurance plan choice; showed that voluntary high-deductible plan adoption produces far smaller spending reductions than randomized estimates predict.
- Estimating welfare in insurance markets (Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen 2010, QJE): Framework using price variation to estimate welfare in insurance markets, allowing decomposition of the welfare cost of adverse selection.
- Risk preferences from deductible choice (Cohen and Einav 2007, AER): Used Israeli auto insurance data to estimate risk preferences from deductible choices.
- Optimal mandates and annuity market (Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf 2010, Econometrica): Welfare cost of asymmetric information in the UK annuity market.
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