Cawley and Ruhm 2011 — The Economics of Risky Health Behaviors

health-behaviorsrisky-behaviorsobesitysmokingalcoholaddictionrational-addictionhyperbolic-discountingbehavioral-economicsSEShealth-gradientwagesemploymentmedical-costspolicytaxationmortalitydisabilityliterature-review

Summary

A 162-page handbook chapter for the Handbook of Health Economics, Vol. 2 (NBER WP 17081), providing a comprehensive overview of the theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence on the economics of risky health behaviors — smoking, alcohol, drug use, diet, physical inactivity, and obesity. Uniquely organized by underlying economic concepts rather than by individual behavior, enabling cross-behavior synthesis. The chapter covers: (1) the scale and distribution of health behavior risks; (2) the Grossman health capital model and Theory of Rational Addiction; (3) non-traditional models (hyperbolic discounting, bounded rationality, visceral factors, dual-self); (4) economic consequences of risky behaviors (medical costs, education, wages, employment, crime); and (5) policy instruments (taxes, information, advertising restrictions, defaults).

Key Claims

Scale of the Problem

SES and Health Behaviors

Grossman Health Capital Model

Theory of Rational Addiction (TORA — Becker and Murphy 1988)

Time Preference

Non-Traditional Models

Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997): discount factor for immediate vs. near-future (βδ\beta\delta) is lower than for any two future periods (δ\delta). If β<1\beta < 1, preferences are time-inconsistent. Gruber and Koszegi (2001) incorporate this into a smoking model; key implication is that standard TORA tests cannot distinguish rational addiction from time-inconsistent preferences.

Rational addiction with learning (Orphanides and Zervos 1995): individuals are uncertain about whether they are the "addict type." Overoptimists (underestimating their addictive tendency) are most likely to become addicted; all addicts regret their decision ex post. Policy can improve welfare by providing information that reduces divergence between subjective and objective risk.

Visceral factors (Loewenstein 2000): acute emotions — hunger, anger, sexual desire — create "hot states" where individuals appear to exhibit extreme discounting. In cold states, individuals systematically underestimate how much hot-state visceral factors will affect their choices.

Cue-triggered consumption (Laibson 2001): repeated pairing of environmental cues with addictive goods creates complementarity; the smell of food or sound of ice in a glass generates cravings. Strategic cue management (avoiding people, places, and smells associated with consumption) is a rational response.

Dual-self models (Thaler and Shefrin 1981): internal battle between a farsighted "planner" (prefrontal cortex) and myopic "doer" (limbic system). The planner can constrain the doer through costly precommitment, willpower expenditures, and mental accounting rules.

Bounded rationality: Akerlof (1991) shows small per-period biases toward present utility can accumulate into large errors; procrastination as repeated failures to follow through on intended behavior changes.

Economic Consequences

Macroeconomic fluctuations (Ruhm): In bad economic times, heavy drinking, smoking, obesity, and physical inactivity all decrease; diets improve. Two mechanisms: (1) income reductions lower some unhealthy consumption; (2) time-intensive healthy behaviors (exercise) increase when work hours fall. A 11 pp increase in unemployment reduces total mortality by 0.30.30.5%0.5\%, with large drops in coronary heart disease and traffic fatalities; cancer mortality is unaffected. Evans and Moore (2009) show the same causes of death exhibit large within-month variation (consistent with "full wallet" effects, not intertemporal optimization).

Medical care costs:

Education: Binge drinking reduces high school graduation probability by up to 14.5%14.5\% for males (Renna 2007). High school frequent drinkers complete 2.22.2 fewer years of college (Cook and Moore 1993).

Employment: Problem drinking reduces employment probability by 50%50\% for men and 40%40\% for women in Finnish data (Johansson et al. 2007). Obese job applicants 6688 pp less likely to receive interview invitations in audit study (Rooth 2009).

Wages: Moderate alcohol consumption raises income by +10%+10\% ("drinker's bonus"); smoking reduces income by 24%-24\% (Auld 2005). White female wages begin declining at BMI 23\approx 23 (well within healthy range), suggesting a beauty premium rather than pure obesity penalty (Gregory and Ruhm 2011). Two-standard-deviation weight increase → 18%-18\% wages for white females (Cawley 2004 IV).

Crime: Crack cocaine introduction into a city raised urban crime rates by \approx 10%10\% (Grogger and Willis 2000). Higher alcohol taxes → lower crime (Carpenter and Dobkin 2010).

Policy

Concepts Introduced or Extended

Entities Mentioned

Quotes

"By far the strongest results are that higher socioeconomic status (SES), as proxied by educational attainment or family income, is generally correlated with healthier behaviors."

"Cutler and Glaeser (2005) find that the correlations across health behaviors are 'surprisingly low' (p. 238); most below 10%, with the highest (alcohol and smoking) at 16%... suggesting that time preference is not a major determinant of health behaviors."

"In bad economic times, heavy drinking and drunk-driving, smoking, obesity, and physical inactivity decrease and diets improve... a one percentage point increase in unemployment reduces total mortality by 0.3 to 0.5 percent."

My Take

The paper's most durable contributions are methodological: the cross-behavior organization reveals that the TORA, hyperbolic discounting, and visceral factors are all special cases of a more general framework for modeling self-control failures; and the Ruhm macroeconomic findings give the most credible causal identification available for the health-behavior–mortality relationship. The Cawley-Meyerhoefer obesity medical cost result (IV = 4×4\times OLS) is one of the field's best illustrations of why self-reported weight data leads to severe attenuation bias. For the wiki, the most important connections are: (1) the procyclical mortality literature directly informs DI application cyclicality and Cawley et al. 2009 (next paper); (2) the SES behavioral gradient literature provides context for the widening mortality-education gradient documented in Bound et al. (2015), Case and Deaton (2015/2017), and Waldron (2007); and (3) the disability-externalities section of the taxation discussion connects to the Disability Insurance (DI) moral hazard literature throughout the wiki.