Wayne and Jodi Cooperman Professor of Economics at Stanford and senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR). Works on health economics, disability insurance, pharmaceutical markets, and government transfer programs.
Original conditional applicants framework (Autor and Duggan 2002, CRR WP): Working paper introducing the "conditional applicants" concept and estimating that DI liberalization reduced measured U.S. unemployment by ~0.64–0.65 pp by 1998. Established the core replacement-rate and demand-shock mechanisms later published as the 2003 QJE paper. See Conditional DI Applicants and DI Replacement Rate.
DI growth and replacement rate mechanism (Autor and Duggan 2003): With David Autor, showed that reduced screening stringency, declining low-skill wages, and rising DI replacement rates combined post-1984 to substantially expand the DI rolls, particularly among low-education workers. The demand-shock IV (Bartik instrument) evidence shows application rates 2–3× more responsive to labor market shocks post-reform. See DI Replacement Rate and DI Growth Decomposition.
Three-cause framework and fiscal synthesis (Autor and Duggan 2006): JEP synthesis formalizing three causes of DI growth — 1984 Reform Act, rising replacement rate (bracket + earnings history effects), rising female insured rates — and documenting the fiscal trajectory (DI payroll tax 1.0% → 1.8%; average award PV $245,000). Established the "unemployability insurance" characterization and documented ALJ appeals breakdown (attorney representation 37% → 70%; ALJ share of all awards 12% → 27%). See DI Growth Decomposition, Conditional DI Applicants, and DI Application Costs and Take-Up.
Income vs. substitution effects in DI (Autor and Duggan 2007): With David Autor, identified the income effect of disability compensation using the 2001 Agent Orange VDC expansion as a natural experiment. Vietnam-era veteran males reduced LFP by 3.21 pp relative to nonveteran controls after the policy change, despite VDC having no implicit tax on work — isolating the pure income effect. Argues that all Ticket to Work–style interventions exclusively address the substitution channel and may therefore have minimal leverage. See Causal Effects of DI Receipt.
FRA behavioral substitution into DI (Duggan, Singleton, and Song 2007): Co-authored the cohort-analysis study using SSA CWHS data for men born 1935–1945. The 1983 FRA increase phases early OA at 62 from 80% to 70% of PIA while leaving DI unchanged, widening the DI financial advantage. Year-of-birth variation in the OA/DI benefit ratio identifies the causal effect: ~42,000 additional male DI recipients long-run (1.3% of male rolls), concentrated at ages 63–64 and among low-AIME workers. The DI increase offsets only 3.9% of OASDI savings from the FRA rise. See DI Growth Decomposition.
VA DC enrollment and expenditure effects (Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton 2010): First rigorous economic study of the VA's Disability Compensation program. Using the 2001 Agent Orange / diabetes decision as a natural experiment (difference-in-differences: Vietnam theater veterans vs. other veterans), estimated DC enrollment increased by 6 pp (200–238K veterans), DC expenditures increased 50B present value). No effect on veteran labor supply; significant spousal labor supply reduction via household wealth effect. Validates the medical eligibility mechanism central to Duggan-Imberman (2009). See DI Growth Decomposition and Causal Effects of DI Receipt.