Coe and Rutledge 2013 — How Does the Composition of Disability Insurance Applicants Change across Business Cycles

disability-insurancebusiness-cycleapplicant-compositionblinder-oaxacagreat-recessionconditional-di-applicantshealth-and-retirement-studysippprogram-integrity

Summary

Using Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)–Social Security Administration (SSA) linked data across three economic periods (2001–03 recession, 2004–06 expansion, 2008–10 Great Recession (GR)), Coe and Rutledge show that recession-era Disability Insurance (DI) applicants are younger, better educated, higher earning, and more recently employed — the demographic signature of Conditional DI Applicants. Critically, observable compositional shifts explain less than 40%40\% of the rise in application rates and less than 25%25\% of the rise in allowance rates, and the award rate rose when it should have fallen — implying a structural change in both application behavior and SSA evaluation practices unexplained by standard economic and demographic predictors.

Key Claims

Concepts Introduced or Extended

Entities Mentioned

Quotes

"The composition of applicants in the Great Recession looks more like the conditional DI applicant — healthier, better educated, recently employed — than those in prior recessions."

"The observable characteristics of applicants explain less than 40 percent of the change in application rates between the expansion and the Great Recession."

"The award rate increased during the Great Recession, despite the composition of applicants appearing healthier — a result that is at odds with a purely mechanical compositional story."

My Take

The paper makes two distinct contributions of unequal strength. The composition finding is well-documented: recession applicants fitting the conditional-applicant profile (younger, better educated, recently employed) is exactly what Autor and Duggan predicted and what Lindner et al. (2017) later confirm with far larger administrative data. The stronger claim — the award-rate paradox and its implication of structural behavioral change — is intriguing but underidentified. The Blinder-Oaxaca residual is by construction unexplained, and the paper cannot rule out that unobserved health differences (not captured by HRS/SIPP measures) or processing-time dynamics explain the award rise. Still, the cross-validation of composition findings across two independent datasets (HRS and SIPP) is methodologically valuable, and the award-rate anomaly is a real empirical puzzle that motivates further research.