Alexander Strand

Overview

Researcher at the Office of Economic Analysis and Comparative Studies, within SSA's Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics (ORES), Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, Social Security Administration. Works on disability program analysis, administrative decision processes, and vocational factors in DI eligibility.

Key Contributions / Features

• Co-authored with Brad Trenkamp "When Impairments Cause a Change in Occupation" (Social Security Bulletin 75(4), 2015): first administrative-data study of the "own-occupation impairment" population — DI claimants denied at Step 5 of the sequential process because they retain capacity for some work in the national economy. Key finding: employment fell 21.8 pp and median earnings fell to 77 cents on the dollar post-denial; mental disorders produced the largest declines; 78% worked at some point post-denial (comparable to VR recipients). Provides a descriptive benchmark for the DI coverage gap.
• Co-authored with Bernard Wixon the canonical documentation of how SSA's sequential determination steps map to the Regulation Basis Code in administrative data (Wixon and Strand 2013).
• Processing delay and labor force decay (Autor, Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2015, NBER WP 20840): using the DIODS universe of 1,039,221 2005 initial SSDI determinations, co-authored the study establishing the delay-decay channel. Separate jackknife examiner IVs for processing time (EXTIME) and allowance propensity (EXALLOW) identify that each additional month of processing time reduces employment by 0.44–0.52 pp (year 3) and earnings by $133/year; a 5-month waiting period falsification test confirms the mechanism is human capital atrophy from LFP exit. The joint two-IV system corrects the MMS (2013) receipt estimate upward from −27 pp to −48 pp (year 3). See Causal Effects of DI Receipt and DI Application Costs and Take-Up.
• Vocational grid age-criteria reform test (Strand and Messel 2019, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, DOI: 10.1002/pam.22134): co-authored with Matthew Messel the first causal test of the residual work capacity assumption underlying proposals to raise the vocational grid's age thresholds. Using the MMS (2013) examiner IV on DIODS/DER/CPMS administrative data (N = 171,880 for ages 55–56; N = 167,179 for ages 52–53), the paper finds: (1) DI allowance reduces above-SGA employment by −11.2 pp for marginal applicants aged 55–56, an upper bound on the share who would work if denied; (2) the difference in work-disincentive effects across the age-55 threshold is 1.7 pp and statistically indistinguishable from zero; (3) 76.7% of age 55–56 applicants are always-takers (would receive DI regardless of examiner), while only 17.3% are marginal. Core policy conclusion: raising the grid's age thresholds would primarily shift the pathway to allowance (from ALJ-stage to initial-stage) rather than producing sustained increases in labor force participation. See Vocational Grid and Matthew Messel.
• Co-authored Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2015, AER P&P): documented Great Recession application surge (6.7% at peak), onset-to-filing gap evidence for conditional applicant mechanism, and the DDS's role in stripping cyclicality from established onset dates.
• Co-authored Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013, AER): used examiner assignment as an IV to estimate the causal work-disincentive effect of SSDI receipt; found ~28% of marginal beneficiaries would have worked if denied.
• Co-authored Gelber, Moore, and Strand (2016): companion RKD paper using the upper bend point to estimate the income effect of DI payment size on earnings. $1 DI → −$0.20 annual earnings; income effect nearly equals the total crowdout from MMS (2013) and French/Song (2014), implying substitution effects (SGA) account for little of the observed work disincentive.
• Co-authored Gelber, Moore, and Strand (2017): used a Regression Kink Design at bend points in the DI benefit formula to show that $1,000/year in additional DI income reduces annual mortality by 0.26 pp at the lower bend point (elasticity −0.56); cost per life-year ~$59,000 — a previously uncounted benefit of DI.

Related

• Matthew Messel
• Brad Trenkamp
• Bernard Wixon
• Nicole Maestas
• Kathleen Mullen
• Alexander Gelber
• Timothy Moore
• Social Security Administration
• Disability Insurance Program
• SSA Sequential Determination Process
• Vocational Grid
• Conditional DI Applicants
• DI Beneficiary Mortality
• Regression Kink Design

Sources

• Strand and Trenkamp 2015 — When Impairments Cause a Change in Occupation
• Wixon and Strand 2013 — Identifying SSA's Sequential Disability Determination Steps
• Maestas Mullen and Strand 2015 — Disability Insurance and the Great Recession
• Gelber Moore and Strand 2016 — The Effect of Disability Insurance Payments on Beneficiaries Earnings
• Gelber Moore and Strand 2017 — Disability Insurance Income Saves Lives
• Autor Maestas Mullen and Strand 2015 — Does Delay Cause Decay The Effect of Administrative Decision Time on the Labor Force Participation and Earnings of Disability Applicants
• Strand and Messel 2019 — The Ability of Older Workers with Impairments to Adapt to New Jobs
• Carey Miller and Molitor 2025 — Why Does Disability Increase During Recessions Evidence from Medicare
• Deshpande and Lockwood 2022 — Beyond Health Nonhealth Risk and the Value of Disability Insurance
• French and Song 2014 — The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply
• Gettens et al 2018 — Accounting for Geographic Variation in Social Security Disability Program Participation
• Low and Pistaferri 2020 — Disability Insurance Theoretical Trade-Offs and Empirical Evidence
• Maestas Mullen and Strand 2013 — Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work
• Meseguer 2013 — Outcome Variation in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program The Role of Primary Diagnoses
• Meseguer 2018 — Correlation Patterns between Primary and Secondary Diagnosis Codes in the Social Security Disability Programs
• Mueller Rothstein and von Wachter 2016 — Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession
• Raut 2017 — Exits from the Disability Insurance Rolls Estimates from a Competing-Risks Model
• Ruffing 2015 — Geographic Pattern of Disability Receipt Largely Reflects Economic and Demographic Factors
• Rutledge Zulkarnain and King 2019 — The Relationship Between Occupational Requirements and SSDI Activity
• Van de Water 2015 — The Realities of Work for Individuals with Disabilities